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COMMENTARY
FILIPE CARREIRA DA SILVA
Time is of the essence:
Remarks on Michael Mann’s
The Sources of Social Power1
I would like to begin this commentary on Michael Mann’s (b. 1942) work by focusing upon his critical engagement with Theda Skocpol in the second volume of The Sources of Social Power, his magnum opus 
and one of the most ambitiously conceived sociological treatises of the last 
few decades. The object of this engagement is post-revolutionary France. 
In Mann’s view, while it is indisputable that French revolutionaries modern-
ized and  bureaucratized state administration, this does not mean that the size 
or scope of total administration increased at all. Also, the performance of the 
revolutionary state was far from the image of efficiency it projected of itself. 
For instance, its fiscal record was pathetic; it was unable to collect more than 
10% of the taxes it demanded. For most of the nineteenth century, France had 
not one administration but several ministries, in which personal discretion 
prevailed over the abstractness and universality one associates with modern 
bureaucracy. Mann writes: ‘So the French Revolution, like the American, 
1 This text builds upon and expands the discussion of Michael Mann’s work in Baert & Silva 
(2010, pp. 170-181).
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promised more bureaucracy than it delivered. (…) Skocpol and Tilly empha-
size bureaucratization and state power; I emphasize their limits’’ (Mann, 1993, 
p. 463).
Enlightening as this critical remark certainly is about Michael Mann’s rela-
tive positioning within the sub-field of historical-comparative sociology, it tells 
us little about his position within social theory more generally. For that, which 
is the aim of this paper, the relevant comparison is not with Skocpol, Tilly, or 
the later Giddens, who can all be said to illustrate the recent empirical turn in 
social theory, but with Talcott Parsons, the single most influential post-war 
American sociologist whose structural-functionalism reigned supreme practi-
cally until the early 1970s.
Mann’s lifelong aim has been to produce a theory with a degree of abstract-
ness and generality equivalent to Parsons’s structural functionalism. Unlike 
Parsons, however, Mann rejects a conception of human societies as social sys-
tems founded on shared beliefs and expectations. Mann’s alternative consists 
in claiming that society is not a totality, neither is it a system. Instead, he offers 
us an analytical point of entry to deal with the ‘impure’ and ‘promiscuous’’ 
(1993, p. 10) complexity of social life in the form of a model of the overlapping 
and intersecting networks of power that constitute society. Mann distinguishes 
four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political 
(iemp). Unlike Parsons’s agil model, with its Adaptation, Goal Attainment, 
Integration, Latency functional imperatives, Mann’s iemp model does not refer 
to an abstract social system divided into sub-systems or dimensions. Rather, 
it is a formalization of the major social networks present in concrete human 
societies from the beginning of historical records to the present. Let us now 
see in further detail how Mann conceptualizes the sources of social power and 
their institutional forms. This will be followed by a brief analysis of two books 
in which he applies this ‘developmental account of an abstraction, power’ 
(Mann 1986, p. 538), to concrete historical phenomena such as fascism and 
ethnic cleansing. I conclude with a brief discussion of some of the questions 
raised by Mann’s studies of the key category of events.
The starting assumption of Mann’s iemp model is that social life can best be 
conceived of as a drama in which social actors struggle, sometimes to the death, 
to control ideological, economic, military, and political power organizations. 
The exercise of general power over a territory is made through a combination 
of four specific types of power. ‘Ideological power’ refers to the social power 
that the control of an ideology brings to those groups and individuals who 
monopolize it. Mann has two distinct examples in mind here; religions and 
secular ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and nationalism. The impor-
tance of these meaning-producing movements lies in their ability to control a 
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crucial human need, namely to find meaning in life, be it in a religious ritual 
or in a political rally. ‘Economic power’ is particularly important as it concerns 
the need to produce in order to subsist. No human society can survive for very 
long without extracting, transforming, distributing, and consuming natural 
resources. The struggle for the control of economic power is thus a crucial 
feature of social life. Going beyond Marx, Mann argues that the organizational 
forms of economic power include not only social classes, but also social sec-
tions and segments. For instance, any given social class is composed of several 
sections (say, a skilled trade), whereas a segment is here used as a group whose 
members are drawn from several classes (say, the social segment ‘patron-cli-
ent’ includes members of at least two different social classes). Mann’s analysis 
is thus more fine-grained than conventional social class analysis, dealing bet-
ter with the multi-causal and multi-level character of most social phenom-
ena. ‘Military power’ refers to how the modern nation-state has a monopoly of 
violence. This source of social power is relatively recent. Until the nineteenth 
century, armies were often controlled by noblemen as in the Middle Ages, or 
had substantial autonomy from the political power. So general power is exer-
cised through a combination of all four types, which enjoy relative autonomy 
from each other. The last type, ‘political power’, refers to the power exerted by 
the state (on his theory of the state, see also Mann, 1988). The regulation of the 
nation-state’s territory by a central administrative bureaucracy has proved to 
be an essential ingredient in modern human history.
Mann labels his theory of the state as ‘institutional statism’, a part of his 
more general ‘organizational materialism’ (Mann, 1993, p. 52). His theory 
of the state comes in two stages. First, Mann tries to provide an institutional 
definition of the state. In order to do so, he reinterprets Weber’s conception 
of the state from a neo-institutionalist perspective. He is thus able to identify 
several organized actors in domestic and foreign policy, the two main areas of 
state intervention. Second, by resorting to a functionalist analysis, he seeks to 
counter the tendency of institutionalist analysis to proliferate organizational 
complexity. He does this by developing a polymorphous theory of ‘higher-level 
state crystallizations’ (Mann, 1993, p. 54). What does this mean? The idea is 
that every state is polymorphous, i. e., it is composed of multiple institutions. 
Over time, these institutions tend to crystallize. Thus, realist scholars tend 
to claim that modern states have crystallized into security-pursuing states, 
whereas Marxists usually argue that they have crystallized as capitalist states. 
Mann’s approach offers a synthesis of these perspectives. In his view, there are 
four basic ‘higher-level crystallizations’ – ‘capitalist, militarist, representative, 
and national’ (Mann, 1993, p. 81) – none of which has ever enjoyed hegemonic 
status.
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Mann has recently applied this social theoretical framework to the anal-
ysis of concrete historical phenomena. In the 2004 Fascists, the book whose 
translation into Portuguese has brought us here together today, Mann offers an 
exemplary combination of historical in-depth research and general social-sci-
entific analysis. He comes very close to actually bridging the gap between 
history and sociology. First, he engages in a comparison of the trajectories of 
fascist movements in Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, Hungary, and Romania. 
Second, he provides insightful single country inter-regional comparisons. 
Third, he combines these with analyses of the successive phases of the devel-
opmental process of each fascist movement (Mann, 2004, pp. 1-30). Mann is 
thus able to make an important contribution to the literature on authoritarian 
regimes. He shows that in all six cases there is a prevalent core fascist constit-
uency, i. e., a social basis of support that made it possible for fascist regimes 
to emerge and consolidate. Rather than being supported by the lower middle 
class, as usually assumed, Mann demonstrates that a heterogeneous social set 
comprising soldiers, veterans, civil servants, teachers, and members of an eth-
nic majority living in a disputed territory provided fascism with its social basis 
of support. Furthermore, Mann shows that in Nazi Germany a segment of civil 
society (namely, small-town, Protestant, middle-class associations) provided 
key support to Hitler’s regime (Mann, 2004, pp. 177-206). This finding seems 
to confirm Jeffrey Alexander’s thesis in Real Civil Societies on the ambivalent 
character of civil society, while crucially questioning the pervasive assumption 
in so many neo-Tocquevillian empirical political science studies of ‘trust’ and 
‘social capital’, according to which civic participation is necessarily connected 
with liberal democracy. What Mann’s Fascists shows us is that it is not. Civic 
participation does not necessarily promote liberal democracy; it can, and often 
does, promote authoritarianism.
Another application of his social theory is The Dark Side of Democ-
racy, a monumental study of ethnic cleansing first published in 2005. Oddly 
enough, however, Mann’s analysis of ethnic cleansing is not limited to dem-
ocratic regimes, either in formation or established. Most of the book is not 
about democracies at all. Mann discusses at length the Armenian genocide, 
the Holocaust, the communist cleansing, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. 
Contrary to what is suggested by the title, ethnic cleansing emerges not as the 
dark side of democracy but of nationalism. This incongruity, however, should 
not discourage readers. The Dark Side of Democracy is, beyond doubt, the sin-
gle best work by a historical sociologist on ethnic cleansing available today. 
Mann begins by identifying a set of necessary conditions for ethnic cleansing 
to occur (Mann, 2005, pp. 1-33). These include: 1) a divided elite from which 
a segment becomes radicalized; 2) a core constituency composed chiefly of 
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young males, which is mobilized in support of the radical segment of the elite; 
3) several ethnic groups, with competing claims on territory and the state; 
4) a crisis situation that dramatically enhances a sense of insecurity among the 
elite. Generalizing from several case studies, Mann suggests that ethnic cleans-
ing typically occurs when three factors come together: there is a radicalized 
segment of the elite, it is in control of the state, and it mobilizes its social sup-
port to carry out the killings in response to the intensification of the crisis situ-
ation. Mann is thus rejecting two established explanations of ethnic cleansing, 
that it requires massive social support and that it is a state-planned endeavor. 
On the contrary, he claims, murderous ethnic cleansing, a distinctively mod-
ern phenomenon, has been the work of a relative few and it is far from being a 
carefully implemented state policy planned long in advance.
What these works demonstrate is Mann’s singular ability to move back and 
forth between the explanation of particular historical events, and the explana-
tion of macro-historical units of analysis such as societies or civilizations. To 
a great extent, this ability stems from what William Sewell has aptly described 
as Mann’s: ‘eventful conception of temporality’ (2005, p. 121). There are three 
reasons for this. First, Mann’s analyses clearly emphasize the interconnected-
ness of social temporalities and social space. In other words, his sensitivity to 
historical events goes hand-in-hand with a conception of social space as con-
stituted by multiple, overlapping networks, rather than social systems. Second, 
by adopting a long-term perspective, he is able to reconfigure the very notion 
of event. Events are no longer confined to episodic, short-term changes – pro-
cesses that mark decisive breaks with history and bring about deep and irre-
versible structural transformations. Even if these processes lasted for centuries, 
they are nevertheless to be understood as events. Third, his eventful sociology 
forces us to reconsider the directionality of historical change. In particular, 
I find it especially important the way Mann is able to undercut the dichotomy 
between evolutionary teleology and the all-too common denial that historical 
directionality is an issue at all. He does so by emphasizing the interconnect-
edness of individual agents and structural patterns of change. In their ‘attempt 
to control the world and increase their rewards within it by setting up power 
organizations of varying but patterned types and strengths’, Mann tells us in 
his characteristic style, ‘real men and women impose patterns’. These ‘power 
struggles are the principal patternings of history, but their outcomes have often 
been close-up’ (1986, p. 532). Mann undercuts the dichotomy between evo-
lutionary teleology and the denial of historical directionality by reconciling 
historical development (indeed, one of Mann’s central questions relates to how 
power resources develop), with an appreciation of the role of historical contin-
gency.
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Despite the criticisms that have been levelled at Michael Mann’s work in 
and beyond sociology departments over the years, I confess that I am very 
much taken by this kind of approach. Why? Because we seldom find anyone so 
seriously engaged in reconnecting social scientific explanation, the sacrosanct 
aim of ‘numbers-and-maths’ social scientists, and macro-history, commonly 
thought to be the natural turf of humanist-inclined historians. Time and again, 
Mann has shown that this separation is not a necessity, but a choice. For this 
reason alone, if no other, Michael Mann’s historically-minded macro-sociol-
ogy has much to commend it.
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